This paper investigates whether economies of scale and scope exist for tax planning. In particular, do multinational corporations avoid more taxes than U.S. domestic-only companies, resulting in lower effective tax rates? While the empirical results indicate that ceteris paribus, larger corporations have higher effective tax rates, firms with greater pre-tax income have lower effective tax rates. I find evidence that multinational corporations, including those with greater income, report lower effective tax rates than do U.S. domestic-only companies. Finally, I find that multinational corporations with more extensive foreign operations report lower effective tax rates than do other firms. Overall, I find substantial evidence of economies of scale and scope to tax planning.
Introduction
Previous research examining average effective tax rates (ETRs) has found a wide variety of relations between ETRs and firm characteristics such as size, income, leverage, capital intensity, and return on assets. This paper attempts to reconcile the contradictory evidence in the extant literature by addressing economies of scale and scope.
Specifically, do economies of scale and scope exist for tax planning such that firms of greater economic scale and scope avoid more income taxes, resulting in lower ETRs? 1 This paper defines ETRs as the ratio of income taxes currently payable to pre-tax accounting income. Thus, ETRs can be interpreted as a measure of the effectiveness of tax planning, where the amount of taxes currently payable to the government is compared to the amount of income reported to investors in the financial statements. This paper contributes to the extant literature by focusing on a significant source of variation in ETRs -foreign operations. In particular, do multinational corporations avoid more taxes than domestic-only companies? Multinational corporations are fundamentally different from firms that operate in a single country and these fundamental differences are likely to affect the variation in ETRs across all firms. Leblang (1998) claims that multinational corporations "may have significantly greater opportunities to escape tax with respect to cross-border investments than with respect to strictly domestic investments" (p. 181). Multinational corporations have 1 As used in this paper, the term 'tax avoidance' includes any tax planning method that taxpayers use to legally reduce their income tax payments. Tax evasion (fraud) is not considered 'tax avoidance' for purposes of this paper.
opportunities to avoid income taxation by locating operations in low-tax rate countries, by shifting income from high-tax locations to low-tax locations, by exploiting differences between the tax rules of different countries, and by taking advantage of tax subsidy agreements with host countries. However, Collins and Shackelford (1999) conclude that "empirical findings in this area are insufficient and inconclusive and fail to either support or undermine Leblang's assertions" (p. 131) .
This paper analyzes the ETRs of U.S. multinational corporations compared to U.S. domestic-only companies. I first perform empirical tests on a broad sample of U.S. domestic and multinational corporations. I then focus the analysis on a sub-sample of U.S. multinational corporations only.
In the broad sample of U.S. domestic and multinational corporations, I find that larger firms have higher worldwide ETRs. This finding is consistent with much of the prior literature, which concludes that larger firms face political costs that smaller firms do not. Holding firm size constant, I also find that firms with greater income have lower worldwide ETRs. This result contradicts Wilkie (1988) , which does not control for firm size. The negative relation between worldwide ETRs and income is consistent with large, fixed costs of tax planning that make such activities too costly for firms with income below a certain threshold.
Regarding foreign operations, I document that multinational corporations, and those with higher income, have lower worldwide ETRs than do U.S. domestic-only companies. Finally, for the broad sample of firms I find that, while worldwide ETRs are initially increasing in the extent of foreign operations, worldwide ETRs decrease once foreign operations reach a certain threshold. ETRs have been an important measure of tax burden for government policymakers and academic researchers for at least twenty years.
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For example, a series of reports by the Citizens for Tax Justice (CTJ, 1984 (CTJ, , 1985 (CTJ, , 1986 focus on the ETRs of corporate taxpayers and were instrumental to the Tax Reform Act of 1986. The practitioner literature frequently discusses specific tax planning techniques to reduce corporate ETRs. Levenson (1999) states, "(Certain) strategies … can help companies reduce their effective tax rates from the typical 35 to 40 percent to as low as 10 percent. This reduction translates to higher earnings per share and ultimately places companies in a more favorable light with analysts when compared to competitors." ETR management is so important to the business community that practitioner organizations offer conferences for managers to learn how to reduce their ETRs. 3 Thus, researchers, policymakers, and practitioners alike should understand the components of and variation in ETRs across firms.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: section 2 discusses prior research and develops empirical hypotheses. Section 3 presents the research design and sample selection. Section 4 discusses the results of empirical tests, and section 5 concludes.
ETRs and Economic Scale and Scope

Background
Prior research has examined ETRs as a measure of corporate tax burden (Stickney and McGee, 1982; Porcano, 1986; Wilkie, 1988; Gupta and Newberry, 1992; Omer, et. al., 1993; and Plesko, 1999) ; as evidence of the political cost hypothesis (Zimmerman, 1983; Wang, 1991; and Kern and Morris, 1992) ; and as a measure of effective tax planning (Mills, et. al., 1998; and Phillips, 2000) . The relationships between ETRs and several firm characteristics are consistent across these studies. For instance, Stickney and McGee (1982) , Gupta and Newberry (1997) , and Mills, Erickson, and Maydew (1998) each document a negative relation between ETRs and leverage and between ETRs and capital intensity.
On the other hand, the evidence about the relation of ETRs to other firm characteristics, such as firm size, income, and foreign operations, is inconsistent across these studies. Firm size is the most controversial variable examined in prior ETR research. Siegfried (1972) , Stickney and McGee (1982) , and Porcano (1986) each find a significantly negative association between ETRs and firm size. In contrast, Zimmerman (1983) and Omer, Molloy, and Ziebart (1993) document a significantly positive relation between ETRs and firm size, while Jacob (1996) , Gupta and Newberry (1997) , and Mills, Erickson, and Maydew (1998) do not find any link. Differences in results have been attributed to sample selection (industry composition, inclusion/exclusion of foreign firms), ETR definition (U.S. federal income tax, worldwide income tax, inclusion/exclusion of deferred taxes), and the time period under investigation.
A substantial portion of previous research applies univariate analysis to examine variation in ETRs across firms. Gupta and Newberry (1997) note the limitations of such studies and examine variation in ETRs in a multivariate framework. Nonetheless, Gupta and Newberry state that a complete model of ETR variability would include additional factors not included in their model, such as the extent of foreign operations. This paper develops a model of ETR variability that analyzes the impact of foreign operations on ETRs and attempts to reconcile the prior literature.
Nearly three decades ago, Siegfried (1972) hypothesized that larger firms should have lower ETRs than smaller firms because larger firms have greater resources with which to (1) influence the political process, (2) develop expertise in tax planning, and (3) organize their activities in optimal tax saving ways. Underlying Siegfried's arguments (and much of the ETR literature) is the concept that ETRs can be considered a measure of effective tax planning.
ETRs reflect the relative tax burden across firms and are usually defined as the ratio of income taxes currently payable to pre-tax accounting income. Since ETRs compare the current tax liability generated by taxable income to pre-tax income based on generally accepted accounting principles, ETRs measure the proficiency of a corporation to reduce its current tax liability relative to pre-tax accounting income.
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Tax avoidance activities impact ETRs in several ways. First, tax avoidance activities often create book-tax differences. Book-tax differences are both temporary and permanent differences between a firm's financial and taxable income. Book-tax differences create variation in ETRs because the numerator is based upon taxable income, whereas the denominator is based upon financial accounting income. Tax motivated transactions commonly create book-tax differences and, consequently, variation in ETRs.
Second, multinational corporations frequently use their foreign operations to avoid income taxation. ETRs also capture this type of income tax avoidance. For example, shifting income from a high-tax jurisdiction to a low-tax jurisdiction reduces a multinational corporation's worldwide ETR. The worldwide ETR is reduced because the denominator has stayed the same (total pre-tax accounting income has not changed), while the numerator is smaller (total income tax expense has decreased). In general, firms that avoid income taxes by reducing their taxable income while maintaining or enhancing their financial income will have lower ETRs, making ETRs a reasonable measure of effective tax planning.
Hypothesis Development
Slemrod (1998) and Grubert and Slemrod (1996) develop economic models of taxpayer behavior. These models assume that taxpayers with greater income and capital investment have lower average and marginal costs of tax avoidance. Consistent with these theoretical predictions, Mills, Erickson, and Maydew (1998) conclude from their empirical tests that larger firms have lower average costs of tax planning. Slemrod (1998) also suggests that the pattern of multinational operations influences a taxpayer's costs of tax avoidance. In particular, the costs of avoidance should be lower for firms that have operations in low-tax locations.
Thus, prior research indicates that the costs of tax planning are decreasing in firm size, income, and foreign operations. While firm size reflects economic scale, and foreign operations reflect economic scope, the level of income reflects both economic scale and scope. 6 The level of income reflects economic scale because the size of the firm influences the size of pre-tax income. The level of income reflects economic scope 6 For purposes of this paper, economic scale refers to the size of a firm's operations and economic scope refers to the diversity of a firm's operations. Researchers frequently measure firm size with total assets, equity, and sales, while diversity of operations can be measured by the number of industries a firm operates in, the number of geographic locations, the extent of vertical integration, or the complexity of operations.
because the diversity of a firm's operations influences the firm's ability to offset losses with income from other business segments. All else equal, negative relations between the costs of tax planning and, respectively, firm size, income, and foreign operations, should translate into more effective tax planning and lower ETRs for firms of greater economic scale and scope.
Large firms are likely to engage in more business activities and more financial transactions than do small firms, providing large firms with more opportunities to avoid income taxes. For example, large firms may be able to avoid income taxation through inter-company transactions, tax-advantaged leasing and financing arrangements, the use of intangibles, and the use of flow-through entities such as partnerships and LLCs. This suggests the following hypothesis, stated in alternative form:
H1: Larger firms avoid more income taxes than do smaller firms, resulting in lower worldwide ETRs. Wilkie (1988) and Wilkie and Limberg (1993) document a reliably positive relation between ETRs and pre-tax income. However, these studies present univariate results that do not control for firm size, which omits an important correlated variable. I claim that firms with greater income are likely to avoid more income taxes than do firms with less income, since firms with greater income have lower costs of tax avoidance.
Intuitively, there are fixed costs of tax planning and unless a firm has income greater than some threshold level, it will not be optimal for that firm to engage in tax avoidance activities. Further, a firm with greater income is likely to avoid more income taxes simply because it has more pre-tax income at stake. This suggests the following hypothesis, stated in alternative form:
H2: Firms with greater pre-tax income avoid more income taxes than do firms with less income, resulting in lower worldwide ETRs.
Multinational corporations are fundamentally different from their domestic counterparts as they operate in multiple political, cultural, and economic environments, as well as different tax jurisdictions. Several studies have considered foreign operations as a determinant of ETRs, but none has designed empirical tests to specifically examine the impact of foreign operations on ETRs. Mills, Erickson, and Maydew (1998) use a dummy variable to indicate the existence of foreign operations and find a significantly positive relationship between ETRs and the foreign operations variable. In contrast, Stickney and McGee (1982) and Jacob (1996) use the ratio of foreign sales to total worldwide sales as a proxy for the extent of foreign operations, but neither study produces compelling results. In addition, all three papers rely on relatively small sample sizes, which means their results may not generalize to the population of firms.
Firms with more extensive foreign operations have opportunities to avoid income taxes that are not available to domestic-only firms. For example, they can avoid income taxes by locating operations in low-tax rate countries, by shifting income from high-tax locations to low-tax locations, by exploiting differences in the tax rules of different countries, and by taking advantage of tax subsidy agreements with host countries.
On the other hand, foreign operations are frequently subject to higher foreign statutory tax rates compared to the U.S. statutory tax rate. In a broad sample of multinational and U.S. domestic-only firms, higher foreign statutory tax rates on average would produce a positive relationship between the extent of foreign operations and worldwide ETRs. Thus, while foreign operations provide multinational corporations with more opportunities to avoid income taxation, they can also expose multinationals to higher foreign tax rates. This suggests the following hypothesis, stated in alternative form:
H3: After controlling for variation in foreign statutory tax rates, firms with more extensive foreign operations have lower worldwide ETRs than do firms with less extensive foreign operations.
Empirical Tests
Methodology
I perform the following regression analyses on a broad sample of firms to test hypotheses one, two, and three: Prior research has shown that ETRs vary widely by industry membership (Zimmerman, 1983; Wilkie, 1988; Harris, 1993; Collins and Shackelford, 1996; Jacob, 1996; and Plesko, 1999) ; and through time (Altshuler and Grubert, 1997 and Altshuler, et. al., 1997) . In addition, statutory tax rates vary substantially around the world, ranging from 0% in some tax havens to more than 50% in Japan and India. Accordingly, I
include dummy variables for industry membership, year, and location of foreign operations in equation (3) domestic-only company decides to expand its operations to a foreign market, it will first expand into the market with the best business opportunities. Since most foreign statutory tax rates are higher than the U.S. statutory tax rate, this initial expansion will typically increase the company's worldwide ETR. However, as the new multinational corporation expands into additional foreign markets, I expect the company to become more proficient at foreign tax planning, including expansion into low-tax countries. This additional expansion will decrease the company's worldwide ETR and create a non-linear relation between WWETRs and FOROPER. 8 Finally, I perform the following regression analyses in a sample of multinational corporations only, to determine whether the relationships between ETRs and the extent of foreign operations are different from the broader sample of firms:
I analyze the worldwide, U.S., and foreign ETRs of the multinational corporations to determine whether the relationships between ETRs and test variables differ between the U.S. and foreign tax jurisdictions. I also include controls for location, industry, and year in equations 7 -9. SIZE is the natural log of net sales and PTI is the natural log of pre-tax accounting income.
Sample Selection
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The ratio of foreign assets to total worldwide assets (FOROPER) captures the extent of a firm's foreign operations.
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As previously discussed, MNC is one for firms with foreign assets or foreign income, zero otherwise.
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MNCxPTI is the interaction of MNC and PTI, and MNCxSIZE is the interaction of MNC and SIZE. observations with negative assets or stockholder's equity (3,820 firm-years), and observations with missing ETR data (122 firm-years).
COMPUSTAT provides domestic and foreign pre-tax income and domestic and foreign income tax expense for firms that disclose such information in their financial statements. Unfortunately, at least three-quarters of the COMPUSTAT population have these variables coded as missing. I assume those firms with missing domestic AND missing foreign data but with 'total' data available do not have foreign operations.
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COMPUSTAT does not provide the domestic and foreign pre-tax income of banks, insurance carriers, and utilities. Rather than assume zero foreign operations for these firms, I deleted these observations from the sample (4,631 firm-years).
Previous ETR studies (Stickney and McGee (1982) , Zimmerman (1983 ), Wilkie (1988 , Shevlin and Porter (1992) , Wilkie and Limberg (1993) , Manzon and Smith (1994) , and Gupta and Newberry (1997) ) have deleted firms with negative tax expense or negative pre-tax income from their samples. Loss firms have different financial and tax reporting incentives and ETRs with negative components do not have an economic interpretation. To be consistent with prior research, I have also deleted firm-year observations with income tax expense or pre-tax income less than or equal to zero (17,271 firm-years).
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12 For example, if COMPUSTAT indicates that a firm has $10,000 total income tax expense but domestic and foreign income tax are coded as missing, I assume that the firm does not have foreign operations.
13 I also performed empirical tests on a sample that included loss firms and controlled for negative pre-tax income and negative income tax expense. The results were substantially the same as those excluding loss firms from the sample. See the discussion in Section 4.3 for further details.
Finally, I performed two actions to eliminate the effects of extreme values. First, I deleted observations (410 firm-years) if they were in the top or bottom one percent of the return on assets distribution. These deletions removed firms with extremely high or extremely low income relative to assets and resulted in a final sample of 19,737 firm-year observations. Second, ETRs greater than one were re-coded as one and ETRs less than zero were re-coded as zero.
Descriptive Statistics
Since much of the subsequent data analysis focuses on the distinction between multinational and U.S. domestic-only firms, Table 3 presents descriptive statistics for the multinational (MNC) and U.S. domestic-only (U.S.) sub-samples separately. Overall, the typical MNC firm is substantially larger, has more income, higher worldwide ETRs, and by definition, more extensive foreign operations than the typical U.S. firm. Within each sample, there is wide variation in total sales, with mean (median) total sales of $3,076 ($546) in the MNC sub-sample and mean (median) total sales of $874 ($120) in the U.S.
sub-sample. Pre-tax accounting income also varies substantially within each subsample, with mean (median) total pre-tax income of $278 ($43) in the MNC sub-sample and mean (median) total pre-tax income of $68 ($8) in the U.S. sub-sample. However, mean and median return on assets is very similar both within and between the two subsamples.
In the MNC sub-sample, the mean (median) foreign ETR of .3211 (.3160) is similar to the mean (median) worldwide ETR of .3252 (.3098), but higher than the mean (median) U.S. ETR of .2842 (.2836). In turn, the mean and median U.S. ETR for multinational firms are very similar to the mean (median) worldwide ETRs of .2924
(.2988) in the U.S. sub-sample. These statistics suggest that foreign statutory tax rates have a positive impact on worldwide ETRs and, on average, the income tax rates of the foreign countries the multinationals operate in are higher than U.S. tax rates.
Finally, the mean (median) extent of foreign operations (FOROPER) of the MNC sub-sample is .2761 (.2439). Thus, the typical multinational firm has substantial foreign operations, as well as greater overall sales and income than a purely domestic company.
However, return on assets and U.S. ETRs are strikingly similar between the two subsamples.
Results
Entire Sample
Tables 4 and 5 present the results of empirical tests using the entire sample of U.S. multinational and domestic-only companies. Contrary to expectations, the estimated coefficients on SIZE in all regression specifications are significantly positive. Results from regression (1), Table 4 suggest that holding income constant, a 1% increase in worldwide sales is associated with a .057% absolute increase in worldwide ETRs.
14 Further, the estimated coefficients on the interaction of MNC and SIZE in regressions (2) and (3) are also reliably positive, indicating that the positive relationship between ETRs and sales is stronger for multinational firms than for U.S. domestic-only firms.
Consistent with hypothesis two, the estimated coefficients on PTI in all regression specifications are significantly negative. Results from regression (1), Table 4 suggest that holding firm size constant, a 1% increase in total pre-tax income is associated with a .059% absolute decrease in worldwide ETRs. Further, the estimated coefficients on the interaction of MNC and PTI in regressions (2) and (3) are also significantly negative, indicating that the negative relationship between ETRs and pre-tax income is significantly stronger for multinational firms than for U.S. domestic-only firms.
The estimated coefficient on the MNC dummy variable in regression (1), Table 4 is significantly positive (0.0247), consistent with higher foreign statutory tax rates producing higher worldwide ETRs in a broad sample of firms. However, the estimated coefficient on the MNC dummy variable is significantly negative (-0.0718) with the inclusion of interaction terms in regression (2), Table 4 . This result suggests that once the regression model controls for the interactions between multinational status and firm size and income, multinational corporations have lower worldwide ETRs, on average, than U.S. domestic-only companies. Finally, the inclusion of location, industry, and year 14 For example, if firm A doubles its total sales from $500,000 to $1,000,000, its worldwide ETR will increase 5.7%, which translates into $28,500 in additional tax liability. If firm B doubles its total sales from $10 million to $20 million, its worldwide ETR will also increase by 5.7%, which translates into $570,000 additional tax liability.
dummy variables in regression (3) does not significantly alter any of the estimated coefficients from regression (2). ). These results are consistent with U.S.
multinational corporations initially expanding into high-tax countries and then further expanding into low-tax jurisdictions to optimize their global operations.
The estimated coefficient on FOROPER is no longer significant with the inclusion of location dummy variables in regression (3). Thus, in a broad sample of firms, the extent of foreign operations likely captures variation in statutory tax rates around the world, and implicitly, a corporation's ability to shift income from high-tax locations to low-tax locations. The positive relation between U.S. ETRs and the extent of foreign operations is likely due to differences between the financial and tax accounting for foreign-source income. Although the details are beyond the scope of this paper, U.S. ETRs will be higher in the year of foreign-source income repatriation for firms in an "excess limit"
Multinational Corporations Only Sample
foreign tax credit position. If the extent of foreign operations is positively correlated with foreign-source income repatriations, the positive relationship between U.S. ETRs and FOROPER is likely due to multinational corporations in an "excess limit" position repatriating foreign-source income. Consistent with this positive relationship, the Internal Revenue Service reports that the majority of U.S. multinational corporations are in an "excess limit" foreign tax credit position.
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Unfortunately, firm specific data that would allow me to verify the foreign tax credit status of my sample firms are not publicly available.
While U.S. ETRs are increasing in the extent of foreign operations, regression (3) shows that foreign ETRs are decreasing in the extent of foreign operations. This significantly negative relation suggests that as multinational corporations expand their operations overseas they engage in more tax avoidance activities, resulting in lower foreign ETRs. This result is also consistent with economies of scope to tax planning.
Finally, the estimated coefficients in Table 6 suggest that multinational corporations that operate in Africa, Asia, Japan, and Oceania (Middle East, South America, and Canada) have significantly higher (lower) worldwide ETRs than other multinational corporations.
In summary, the empirical results strongly indicate that ceteris paribus, larger firms have higher ETRs, while firms with greater pre-tax income have lower ETRs.
These results hold in both the broad sample of firms, as well as the sample of multinational corporations only. I conclude that firms with greater pre-tax income find ways to avoid income taxes and report lower ETRs.
After controlling for the interactions of multinational status and firm size and income, Tables 4 and 5 suggest that multinational firms have lower worldwide ETRs, on average, than U.S. domestic-only companies. Table 5 also suggests that foreign operations may initially expose corporations to higher foreign statutory tax rates, but worldwide ETRs decrease once foreign operations reach a certain threshold. Further, Table 6 shows that while foreign operations have a positive impact on U.S. ETRs, multinational corporations with more extensive foreign operations have lower foreign
ETRs, consistent with economies of scope to tax planning.
Sensitivity Analysis
I performed sensitivity analysis (untabulated) to determine the strength of the main results. Specifically, I tested whether the initial results are sensitive to (1) the inclusion of additional control variables, (2) the inclusion of deferred taxes, and (3) the inclusion of loss firms. Except as noted below, inferences from Tables 4 -6 are not affected by these sensitivity analyses.
Previous research has found significant relationships between ETRs and firm leverage and between ETRs and capital intensity (Stickney and McGee, 1982; Gupta and Newberry, 1997; . Inclusion of these control variables does not change the sign or significance level of any of the estimated coefficients in Tables 4 -6 . Shevlin (1990) , Wang (1991) , Manzon (1994) , and Graham (1996) Although the most common definition of average ETR in previous research has been the ratio of current income tax expense to pre-tax accounting income, some studies have included deferred income taxes in the numerator, as well. To examine whether my results are sensitive to the inclusion of deferred income taxes, I performed the regression analyses with ETRs that include both current and deferred income taxes in the numerators.
The inclusion of deferred taxes alters several estimated coefficients. Specifically, the estimated coefficients on the extent of foreign operations (FOROPER), which were not significant in regression (3) of Table 5 or in regression (1) of Table 6 , become reliably positive. This suggests that corporations with more extensive foreign operations avoid income taxes temporarily by deferring tax liabilities to future time periods.
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To examine the impact of deleting loss firms from my sample (17,271 firm-year observations), I performed sensitivity analyses that retained the loss firms in my sample, while controlling for negative pre-tax income and negative income tax expense. If a firm had negative pre-tax income (income tax expense), then a BOOKLOSS (TAXLOSS) dummy variable was coded as one, zero otherwise. In addition, if a firm had both negative pre-tax income and negative income tax expense, then a DOUBLOSS dummy variable was coded as one, zero otherwise. The inclusion of loss firms in my sample and the use of loss dummy variables modified one result in Tables 4 -6. The estimated coefficients on MNC in Table 4 become significantly positive, rather than significantly negative. This suggests that the sample of U.S. companies includes substantially more loss firms than the multinational sample, shifting the mean worldwide ETR of the U.S.
sample below that of the multinational sample.
17 16 Corporations can defer U.S. taxation of foreign-source income by reinvesting such income in foreign operations, subject to limitations. 17 Univariate statistics indicate that the frequency of losses in the U.S. domestic-only sample is twice as high as that in the sample of multinational corporations only.
Conclusions
This paper investigates whether economies of scale and scope exist for tax planning such that firms of greater economic scale and scope avoid more income taxes than do other firms. In particular, this paper examines the ETRs of multinational corporations compared to the ETRs of U.S. domestic-only companies. Compared to prior ETR research, this paper examines a larger sample of firms in a multivariate framework.
For the time period under investigation (1990 -1997) Table 6 Results of ETR Regression Analysis, with Multinational Sub-Sample Only This table presents the results of regressions of worldwide, U.S., and foreign effective tax rates (WWETR, USETR, FORETR) on: the natural log of net sales (SIZE, USSIZE, FORSIZE), the natural log of pre-tax accounting income (PTI, USPTI, FORPTI), the extent of foreign operations (FOROPER), geographic dummy variables (LOCATION i ), industry dummy variables (INDUS j ), and year dummy variables (YEAR k ). The estimated coefficients for the industry and year dummy variables are not tabulated but are available upon request from the author. The sample contains 4,272 firm-year observations from 1990 -1997. 
